Introduction.
It would be a mistake to think that rational belief in God requires extraordinary argument or evidence, especially in the case of a natural Creator. Richard Swinburne, one of the leading figures in the philosophy of religion, demonstrates that belief in God can be rationally grounded in human experience and testimony. At the heart of his epistemology are two key ideas: the Principle of Credulity and the Principle of Testimony. These principles together establish that belief based on religious experience is innocent until proven guilty—that is, it should be accepted as genuine unless there are specific reasons for doubt.
Rather than placing the burden of proof on believers to show that their experiences are real, Swinburne reverses the presumption. Since we generally trust our senses and other people’s reports in everyday life, we should also trust experiences and testimonies that seem to reveal God, unless there is good reason not to. He develops this argument most fully in The Existence of God (2nd ed., 2004, ch. 13) and also discusses it in Is There a God? (1996, ch. 3).
The Principle of Credulity.
Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity states:
“If it seems to a subject that x is present, then probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so, unless there are special considerations to show that one is mistaken.”1
In simple terms, if something appears to be the case in our experience, we should believe it is the case—unless there is a clear reason to think otherwise. Swinburne applies this both to ordinary sensory experiences and to experiences that seem to involve God.
If a person feels that they are in the presence of a divine being, that appearance should be trusted just as one trusts the appearance of a tree or a mountain. The only grounds for rejecting it would be evidence of illusion, malfunction, or deception.
Swinburne argues that human knowledge would collapse if we did not generally trust appearances. Our entire understanding of the world depends on taking our experiences at face value unless there are clear reasons for doubt.
He writes:
“Unless we had reason to suppose that our cognitive faculties were unreliable, we would have no reason for distrusting them. To reject the veridicality of experience generally would lead to total scepticism.”2
To exclude religious experience from this rule would be arbitrary. If we trust sight, hearing, and memory in all other contexts, we should also trust experiences that seem to reveal God—unless specific counter-evidence shows them to be false.
Suppose someone in quiet prayer suddenly feels a powerful sense of divine love and peace, as if surrounded by a benevolent presence. If that person is mentally healthy and in normal conditions, Swinburne holds that the rational conclusion is that they have indeed experienced God.
Just as we accept the reality of a landscape we see before us, we should also accept the reality of an encounter with God, provided there are no special factors undermining it.
The Principle of Testimony.
Swinburne’s Principle of Testimony complements the first. It states:
“(In the absence of special considerations) the experiences of others are (probably) as they report them.”3
This means we should normally believe what others tell us about their experiences, unless we have reasons to think they are lying, mistaken, or confused. Swinburne notes that nearly all our knowledge depends on testimony—from history, science, geography, and ordinary communication. To reject testimony wholesale would make learning and society impossible.
Swinburne argues that if we are justified in trusting our own experiences, then we are also justified in trusting the sincere reports of others. He writes:
“If we cannot reasonably reject the Principle of Credulity, we cannot reasonably reject the Principle of Testimony; for if people generally misreported their experiences, the Principle of Credulity could not be relied upon either.”4
Thus, just as one’s own experience is innocent until proven guilty, so too is the testimony of others. Unless there are particular reasons for doubt—such as known dishonesty, confusion, or strong conflicting evidence—we should presume that people are describing their experiences accurately.
Presumption of Belief.
The two principles are closely related. The Principle of Credulity justifies belief in one’s own experiences, while the Principle of Testimony justifies belief in others’ experiences.
Together they form a coherent and balanced epistemology:
- Experiences are generally trustworthy.
- Testimony is generally trustworthy.
- Both may be overturned only when specific “special considerations” are present.
This creates a presumption in favour of belief—one that Swinburne essentially describes as innocent until proven guilty. Religious experience, therefore, enjoys the same rational status as any other type of experience until there is reason to disqualify it.
Religious Experience as Evidence for God.
Swinburne argues that these principles together show that religious experience provides genuine evidence for the existence of God. Just as perception of the physical world gives evidence for physical objects, so perception of the divine gives evidence for a divine being.
He writes:
“If many people have experiences apparently of the presence of God, and if these experiences occur under a wide variety of circumstances, then, in the absence of counter-evidence, it is rational to suppose that they are probably veridical.”5
Swinburne acknowledges that no single experience proves God’s existence beyond doubt, but collectively, a large body of credible experiences forms a significant part of the cumulative case for God.
Conclusion.
Belief in God based on experience and testimony is not guilty until proven innocent—it is the other way around. His Principle of Credulity and Principle of Testimony together affirm that both personal perception and the testimony of others should be accepted as reliable unless there is a specific reason for doubt.
To distrust all religious experience would be inconsistent, since the same logic would force us to doubt every other form of experience and testimony on which ordinary knowledge depends. Thus, the rational stance is to trust experience, whether of the natural or the divine, unless compelling counter-evidence arises.
In this way, Swinburne shows that belief in God based on experience is not a leap into irrational faith, but a natural extension of the same reasonable trust we place in our senses and in one another.
The Argument from Religious Experience.
Richard Swinburne’s argument for God’s existence:
(1) For any person S and any object x, if S, on the basis of an apparent experience of x, takes it that x exists, then prima facie it is probable that S’s experience is veridical and thereby x exists. (PC)
(2) If any person S, on the basis of an apparent experience of God, takes it that God exists, then prima facie it is probable that God exists. (From (1) by universal instantiation)
(3) Numerous persons, on the basis of apparent experiences of God, take it that God exists. (Premiss)
(4) Prima facie it is probable that their experiences are veridical and thereby God exists. (From (2) and (3) by modus ponens)
(5) That it is prima facie probable that their experiences are veridical, and thereby the claim that God exists can be defeated only if it is significantly more probable than not that God does not exist. (Premiss)
(6) The cumulative argument shows that it is not significantly more probable than not that God does not exist. (Premiss)
(7) It is probable without qualification that their experiences are veridical, and thereby God exists. (From (3), (4), and (5))
Richard Swinburne. Oxford University Press 2004